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No-Fault Personal Injury Automobile
Insurance: The Quebec and New York
Experiences and a Proposal for
California
By SONJA STENGER*
Member of the Class of 1991
I. INTRODUCTON
One of the primary purposes of the automobile liability insurance
system is to provide compensation to people injured in automobile acci-
dents. Many experts agree that the liability insurance system has been
inadequate and inefficient in providing compensation to auto accident
victims.,
Recovery of damages for injuries suffered under the traditional tort
system is contingent upon the plaintiff's ability to establish that the de-
fendant was at least partially at fault.2 Due to this fault requirement,
many claims must be litigated,3 delaying compensation of the victim by
months or years.4 Numerous victims remain uncompensated or un-
dercompensated, while others receive compensation far in excess of their
actual losses.5 Compensation under the liability insurance system is slow
in coming and uncertain at best.
The automobile liability insurance system is also failing in another
important respect-affordability. Auto liability insurance is becoming
increasingly expensive. The increase in insurance premiums has been at
least partly responsible for a concurrent increase in the number of unin-
* B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1987.
1. See, eg., W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEET o & D. OWEN, PROssER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 83 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETONI.
2. Id. §§ 30, 38.
3. Id § 83, at 598.
4. O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of
Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 898, 899 (1985).
5. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 83, at 598; O'Connell, supra note 4, at 899.
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sured motorists.6 During the last decade, the number of serious automo-
bile accidents caused by uninsured motorists increased by forty percent
nationwide.7 Uninsured drivers cause premiums to rise because insured
drivers must purchase coverage against injury caused by uninsured
drivers.'
No-fault personal injury automobile insurance (no-fault) has been
suggested by a number of scholars as a solution to both of these
problems.9 Studies show that under a no-fault system, more drivers who
suffer personal injury are compensated and they are compensated more
quickly than drivers insured under traditional policies.II Further, recent
data suggests that no-fault premiums do not increase as rapidly as tradi-
tional policy premiums.11
While many states experience the problems of uninsured drivers and
undercompensated victims, California has been particularly hard hit by
the liability insurance crisis. The California court system is severely
clogged, causing extreme delays for traffic accident victims who are
forced to pursue their claims in court. 2 California also has one of the
highest estimated percentages of uninsured drivers in the nation.1 3 Cali-
fornia insurance officials estimate that twenty-five percent of California's
sixteen million cars are uninsured. "4 Reform of the automobile liability
insurance system is needed desperately in California.
In the past, California has been a leader in innovative legislation.
Recently, California legislators and voters have been searching for alter-
6. Hinds, Uninsured Drivers Create Other Kinds of Wreckage, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1990,
at 1, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See, eg., R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VIC-
TIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965).
10. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., COMPENSATING AUTO ACC.IDENT VICTIMS: 1984
FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCES 3-4 (1985) [hereinafter
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.]
11. O'Connell, No-Fault Auto Insurance: Back By Popular (Market) Demand?, 26 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 993, 997-99 (1989). The data cited by Professor O'Connell suggests that the
pure premium (defined as the portion of the premium used to pay losses, excluding an insurer's
marketing and administrative costs and legal defense costs) in New York State, a no-fault
jurisdiction, was 30% lower in 1987 than it would have been under a traditional liability insur-
ance scheme.
12. For example, in Los Angeles County, 10% of all civil cases which reached disposition
in 1987 had been in the court system for 4.5 years or more. In 1989, 10% of all cases handled
under the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act had been in the system for 4.2 years or more.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
LEGISLATURE 39 (1990).
13. Hinds, supra note 6, at 10, col. 4.
14. Id
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natives to the current automobile liability system.15 Whatever alterna-
five California eventually adopts, other states are likely to follow soon
with similar reforms.
Qu6bec and New York State have adopted no-fault auto insurance
acts16 to alleviate the problems associated with traditional tort systems.
Experts consider these no-fault systems to be among the most innovative
and successful no-fault plans in existence. This Note will outline the
Qu6bec and New York no-fault systems, analyzing the differences in the
two and the practical effects of those differences. This Note proposes
that California adopt a no-fault personal injury plan, incorporating some
of the aspects of both the Qu6bec and New York systems, to replace the
traditional liability insurance system in compensating auto accident
victims.
II. NO-FAULT PERSONAL INJURY AUTO INSURANCE
A. Failure of the Traditional Tort System
Traditional insurance is third-party insurance; the insurance com-
pany compensates any third party who has been injured by the policy-
holder's negligence. 17 The bodily injury portion of the policy protects
the policyholders by providing them with a legal defense and paying
damages to any accident victim injured through the policyholder's negli-
gence. 18 By failing to purchase adequate bodily injury liability insurance,
uninsured or underinsured motorists create what is termed the "compen-
sation gap."'"
Certain traditional insurance provisions help bridge the compensa-
tion gap and provide for payment to a number of auto accident victims
who are unable to recover all or part of their losses from the negligent
party's insurer. First, uninsured or underinsured motorist insurance
pays the policyholder's injury losses when the policyholder is injured by
15. In November 1988, there were four auto insurance initiatives on the California ballot,
Propositions 100, 103, 104, and 106. Four auto insurance bills were introduced during the
1989-90 legislative session; none of them progressed to the second house. George, Whither
No-Fault in California: Is There Salvation After Proposition 103?, 26 SAN DIEGO L REv. 1065,
1073-76 (1989).
16. Automobile Insurance Act, Quf. REV. STAT. ch. A-25 (1977), amended by ch. 38,
1980 Qu& Stat. 383, ch. 25, 1981 Qu& Stat. 425, ch. 52, 1982 Qu& Stat. 1033, ch. 59, 1982
Qu. Stat. 1173, ch. 15, 1986 QuE Stat. 135, ch. 28, 1986 Qu6 Stat. 437 [hereinafter Qut- REv.
STAT. ch. A-25]; N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5101-5225 (McKinney 1985).
17. U.S. DEP'T oF TRANsp., supra note 10, at 2.
18. Id. at 2, 9.
19. Id at 12.
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a hit and run, uninsured, or underinsured motorist.20 However, the poli-
cyholder must still show that the other party was at fault.21 Second,
insurance covering medical payments pays medical expenses up to the
policy's limits to all occupants of the policyholder's car, including the
insured, without regard to fault.22
Critics charge that the traditional tort system has failed to provide
adequate compensation to automobile accident victims. 23 To recover
under the traditional system, the injured party must demonstrate that the
defendant was at least partially at fault for the injury.2'1 If the defendant
denies fault, the plaintiff must litigate the claim, 25 which is costly and
time consuming. Months or years may elapse between the time the inju-
ries were sustained and the time the victim receives compensation. 26
Further, numerous victims are either undercompensated or overcompen-
sated.27 The present tort system is thus often characterized as a lottery
in which the parties and their lawyers do not know whether the plaintiff
will recover, even at the time of trial.28
Academics proposed no-fault accident compensation plans as an al-
ternative to the inadequate traditional tort system.29 In the late 1960s
and 1970s, states began to adopt no-fault plans. 30 Today, twenty-three
states and the District of Columbia have implemented some form of no-
fault personal injury auto insurance.31
B. No-Fault Defined
Under no-fault accident compensation plans, the injured party is
compensated without regard to fault.3 2 No-fault insurance is first-party
insurance; the insurance company pays benefits to the policyholder, re-
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 13.
23. See, eg., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 83; O'Connell, supra note 11, at 993.
24. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, §§ 30, 38.
25. Id. § 83, at 598.
26. O'Connell, supra note 4, at 899.
27. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 83, at 598; O'Connell, supra note 4, at 899.
28. See, eg., E. BERNZWEIG, BY ACCIDENT, NOT DESIGN: THE CASE FOR COMPREHEN-
SIVE INJURY REPARATIONS (1980); J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE
LAWYERS WIN 3-8 (1979).
29. See, eg., THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACcI-
DENTS, REPORT TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (1932); R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 9.
30. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 623 (1985).
31. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 10, at 23, 41.
32. Id. at 14.
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gardless of fault, whenever the event insured against occurs.33 Thus,
under no-fault insurance plans, people injured in automobile accidents
make a claim to their own insurance company for indemnification, re-
gardless of who caused the accident.34 In addition, any pedestrian, bicy-
clist, or occupant of the policyholder's car injured in an accident
involving the insured receives compensation for medical expenses under
the insured's policy.
3 5
In the auto insurance context, no-fault usually refers to insurance
against personal injuries; it does not include insurance against property
damage.36 Thus, no-fault insurance policyholders will be indemnified by
their own insurance company only for costs associated with personal
physical injuries when the policyholders are involved in auto accidents."7
Any claim for property damage will be handled under the traditional
system.
The purpose of no-fault automobile insurance plans is to make com-
pensation more readily available when personal injury or death is caused
by an automobile accident.3 8 Instead of having to litigate claims for
medical expenses, the injured policyholder simply makes a claim to the
insurer and receives compensation for the injuries. This process compen-
sates victims much more quickly than a traditional tort suit. 9 However,
the amount of compensation available to an injured party under a no-
fault scheme will be less than that recoverable at common law. 
40
C. Different Types of No-Fault
The primary distinguishing characteristic of no-fault insurance sys-
tems is that the insured's right to bring a lawsuit in tort for personal
injury is limited to some degree. The benefits received under a no-fault
33. Id
34. Id
35. Id at 15.
36. Id at 18. Michigan is the only state in the United States with no-fault property dam-
age automobile insurance.
37. Id at 14.
38. C. BROWN, NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN CANADA 1 (1988).
39. ALL-INDUSTRY RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL, INSURER STUDY OF PIP SERIOUS
INJURY CLAIMS: SECOND FOLLOW-UP (1982). Data collected in this study indicates that no-
fault claimants received 33% of the total benefits they would ever receive within 30 days of the
date on which they notified their insurance company of their injury, while claimants under a
traditional insurance plan received only 8.3% of the benefits they would ever receive within
that 30 day period. One year after notification of their insurers, no-fault claimants had re-
ceived 95.5% of the benefits they would ever receive, while the traditional insurance claimants
had received only 51.7% of the compensation they would ever receive.
40. Love, Punishment and Deterrence: A Comparative Study of Tort Liability for Punitive
Damages Under No-Fault Compensation Legislation, 16 U.C. DAVIS L REv. 232, 234 (1983).
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system serve as a complete or partial substitute for recovery in tort.4 1
Generally, each no-fault system defines a threshold over which an injured
party must cross before bringing a lawsuit in tort. The purpose of the
threshold is to prevent tort lawsuits for damages for pain and suffering in
the absence of serious injury.42
Different jurisdictions establish the threshold in different ways.
Dollar thresholds set an amount of medical expenses which are regarded
as demonstrating that the victim suffered serious injury. 43 Verbal or nar-
rative thresholds define serious injury by reference to the physical effects
of the injury, such as death, disfigurement, or serious impairment of a
bodily function.' If the accident victim's injuries or damages do not
meet the threshold as defined in the jurisdiction, the victim is wholly
precluded from bringing a lawsuit.45 In such a case, the victim is com-
pensated for medical expenses and other injury-related losses by the vic-
tim's own insurer under a no-fault policy.
No-fault insurance plans differ by the extent to which they limit the
insured's right to bring an action in tort. Add-on no-fault plans provide
no-fault personal injury benefits without prohibiting lawsuits as a condi-
tion or prerequisite for receiving the no-fault benefits.4' Add-on no-fault
policies never prohibit the insured from filing a lawsuit.47 They merely
give the insured the option to refrain from filing suit and to file a claim
with the insured's own insurance company for the amount of actual
losses. This type of no-fault existed in Pennsylvania,48 and currently ex-
ists in Oregon,49 Saskatchewan,50 and Ontario,51 as well as in other U.S.
states and Canadian provinces.52
Modified no-fault plans abolish the right to sue in tort except in
cases of very serious injury.5 3 These plans usually eliminate the right to
sue for nonpecuniary losses, such as pain and suffering and loss of enjoy-
41. Id.
42. Id. at 276.
43. Id. at 276-77.
44. Id. at 277.
45. Id. at 276.
46. J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW: NO-FAULT AND BEYOND 280-81
(1975).
47. Id.
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.101-1009.701 (1982) (repealed 1984).
49. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 743.776-743.840 (1989).
50. Automobile Insurance Act, SASK. REV. STAT. ch. 11 (1946).
51. Insurance Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 218 (1980).
52. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 10; C. BROWN, NO-FAULT AUTOMOIDILIE
INSURANCE IN CANADA (1988).
53. J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, supra note 46, at 281-82.
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ment of life.54 Because modified no-fault plan jurisdictions maintain the
victim's right to sue in tort when the victim suffers serious injury,5 the
crucial issue in these jurisdictions becomes how the threshold of "serious
injury" is defined. The definition determines under what circumstances
injured parties retain the right to bring a tort suit.
Most modified no-fault plans also eliminate the right to sue for eco-
nomic losses which are covered by the insurance plan.56 Thus, under a
modified no-fault plan, the insured usually must seek compensation for
wage loss and medical expenses incurred as the result of an accident from
the insured's own insurer. New York,5" Michigan, 8 and several other
states have modified no-fault plans.59
Pure no-fault plans completely eliminate an injured party's right to
sue in tort."° No matter how serious the victim's injuries are, the victim
and the victim's family are prohibited from bringing a lawsuit and must
seek compensation solely from the insurer. Qu6bec is a jurisdiction with
this type of no-fault plan.61
D. The Debate Over No-Fault
No-fault personal injury auto insurance has long been the subject of
heated debate. Those persons opposed to no-fault argue that the amount
of compensation awarded under such plans is too low. Indeed, under no-
fault schemes, the potential for enormous awards for pain and suffering
does not exist for most accident victims. Proponents of no-fault plans
contend that while the amount paid out on a single claim may be less
than the victim could have received under the tort system, overall, far
more accident victims receive compensation for their injuries under no-
fault schemes.62 Further, victims receive compensation more quickly
under a no-fault system than under the tort system.63
Proponents of no-fault plans also argue that no-fault policy premi-
ums are less expensive than traditional liability policy premiums. Recent
studies support this assertion. Data analyzed by Professor Jeffrey
O'Connell of the University of Virginia suggest that auto liability insur-
54. Id
55. Id
56. Id.
57. N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5101-5108 (McKinney 1985).
58. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101-500.3179 (West 1983).
59. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 10, at 23.
60. J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, supra note 46, at 183.
61. See C. BROWN, supra note 38, at 32-33.
62. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 10, at 3.
63. Id at 4.
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ance premiums would be significantly higher in New York had its no-
fault law not been enacted. 64 The principal advantage of less expensive
insurance premiums is that more drivers can afford insurance. When
insurance premiums are high and low-income drivers cannot afford to
buy insurance, rather than refraining from driving, they drive without
insurance.6' When an uninsured driver then causes an accident, premi-
ums for insured drivers increase. Proponents of no-fault plans argue that
the lower no-fault premiums make auto insurance affordable for many
more people. Thus, more drivers are insured and the cost of automobile
accidents is spread more evenly among the driving public.
Opponents of no-fault plans argue that the deterrent function of the
traditional tort system is not served by the no-fault system. The tradi-
tional system theoretically deters dangerous behavior with the threat of
liability.66 Opponents also argue that a no-fault system provides no simi-
lar deterrent effect because the potential consequences of negligent be-
havior are less serious. However, no-fault proponents argue that the
traditional tort system, insofar as auto accidents are concerned, has mini-
mal deterrent effect because costs are transferred away from the liable
parties to their insurer, giving little incentive to alter future conduct.67
The debate over no-fault plans will be further explored in the con-
text of the following analysis of the Qu6bec and New York no-fault
systems.
III. NO-FAULT PERSONAL INJURY AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE IN QUEBEC
The Automobile Insurance Act of Qu6bee (the Act) 68 is widely re-
garded as the most ambitious no-fault automobile insurance plan in
North America. 69 The Qu6bec plan is a pure no-fault plan-it com-
pletely eliminates the auto accident victim's right to sue in tort for any
losses resulting from bodily injury.70
The Act's principal objectives appear to be efficiency and the elimi-
nation of the delays which are associated with judicial review and litiga-
64. O'Connell, supra note 11, at 997.
65. Hinds, supra note 6, at 1, col. 1.
66. Sugarman, supra note 30, at 559-60.
67. Id. at 573.
68. Quaf. REv. STAT. ch. A-25.
69. See O'Connell & Tenser, North America's Most Ambitious No-Fault Law: Qudbec's
Auto Insurance Act, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917 (1987).
70. Qut. REv. STAT. ch. A-25, § 4 ("The indemnities provided for in this title are in the
place and stead of all rights, recourses and rights of action of anyone by reason of bodily injury
and no action in that respect shall be admitted before any court of justice.").
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tion.7 1 With these objectives in mind, the Qu6bec legislature granted
expansive power to the Rdgie de l'assurance automobile du Qudbec (the
Rigie), the administrative agency charged with carrying out the insur-
ance plan implemented by the Act. The Rdgie is responsible for compen-
sating automobile accident victims for their bodily injuries.7 This
agency of government-appointed officials must compensate auto accident
victims "regardless of who is at fault."'7 3
The insurance plan is funded by fees paid annually by registered
vehicle owners and licensed drivers.74 Under the Act, every registered
vehicle owner and licensed driver pays the same rate and receives bodily
injury insurance.75 In 1986 car owners paid approximately 145 Cana-
dian dollars for the bodily injury coverage provided under the Act.76
Coverage for property damage and out-of-province liability is not within
the purview of the Act; private insurance companies sell this coverage to
Qu6bec motorists.77
The Rdgie has "exclusive jurisdiction to inquire into, hear, and de-
cide any matter relating to the compensation of bodily injury" resulting
from an auto accident.71 The Rdgie thus has the power to decide whether
a particular victim is entitled to compensation and the amount of com-
pensation each deserving claimant will receive.7 9
The Rdgie has extensive regulatory power. The Act provides that
the Rigie has the discretion to define terms used in the Act, such as "ac-
cident" and "victim." ' The Rdgie also has power to define "loss of
physical integrity or disfigurement," which is the condition that must be
satisfied to receive compensation for suffering or loss of enjoyment of
life.8" The Rdgie further has the power to establish the "rules of proof
and procedure applicable to the examination, hearing, and decision of the
71. Baudouin, La Nouvelle ligislation qugbicoise sur les accidents de la circulation, 31
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr COMPARE 381, 390 (1979).
72. Qufo. REv. STAT. ch. A-25, § 3. Rdgie de I'assurance automobile du Quibec means
"Quebec Automobile Insurance Administration." Roughly, rigie means "administration."
See 2 &RP'S STANDARD FRENCH AND ENGLISH DICTIONARY R-31 (rev. ed. 1972). The
English version of the Quebec Automobile Insurance Act uses Rigie, and this Note does the
same.
73. Qut- REv. STAT. ch. A-25, § 3.
74. C. BROWN, supra note 38, at 33.
75. Qua. REv. STAT. ch. A-25, §§ 151-152.
76. O'Connell & Tenser, supra note 69, at 927. In 1986 the Canadian dollar was worth
approximately .71 U.S. dollars.
77. C. BROWN, supra note 38, at 33.
78. Qut. REv. STAT. ch. A-25, § 52.
79. Id
80. Id § 195, amended by ch. 59, § 36, 1982 Qu& Stat. 1173, 1184.
81. Id
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matters over which the Rdgie has jurisdiction." 2 Thus, the Rdgie has
broad power to make decisions which significantly impact the scope of
the Act and its application.
To receive compensation in Qu6bec, the auto accident victim first
files an application with the Rdgie requesting reimbursement.83  The
Rigie reviews the application and issues a written decision to the claim-
ant.84 The Rigie has discretionary power to make a prima facie determi-
nation that an application is justified and to begin making payments
immediately before rendering a final decision.85
If a claimant is denied compensation, the claimant may appeal the
Rigie's decision in two ways: by applying to the Rigie for review86 or by
appealing the Regie's decision to the Commission des affaires sociales8,
The Commission's decision is final.88
Benefits provided under the Act include reasonable costs of medical
and paramedical care, ambulance fees, prostheses or orthopedic devices,
and the replacement of clothing.8 9 The Act provides flexibility in the
awarding of medical expenses by giving the Regie discretion to reimburse
accident victims for "other expenses of a similar nature." 90 Costs of re-
habilitative treatment are also covered by the Act. 91 These costs are paid
by the Rigie to the extent that they are not covered by any other "social
security scheme."92
The Canadian National Health Care and Workmen's Compensation
systems are the most important of these other social security schemes.
The National Health Care system significantly decreases the no-fault sys-
tem's expenditures on medical expenses. 93 Under this plan, the Canadian
government guarantees all citizens equal access to quality health care at
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. § 52.
85. Id. § 54.
86. Id. § 55.
87. Id. § 56.
88. Id.
89. Qua. REv. STAT. ch. A-25, § 45, amended by ch. 59, § 23, 1982 Qu6. Stat. 1173,
1180-81.
90. Id.
91. Id. §46.
92. Id. § 45.
93. Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1989, at Al, col. 3. The Canadian plan is essentially an insur-
ance system in which patients choose their own doctors and the government pays the bills.
The patient is treated and the doctor bills the provincial government directly. Unlike the
socialized medicine system in Britain, Canadian doctors are not employed by the state. How-
ever, the Canadian government closely regulates doctors' fees and hospital costs.
[Vol. 14
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no cost to the citizen.94 This comprehensive, tax-financed 95 health plan
is one of the principal reasons why the premium exacted by the .Rgie for
no-fault coverage is so low. The vast majority of medical costs are paid
by the national health plan, not by the no-fault auto insurance fund.
The Canadian Workmen's Compensation system also relieves the
no-fault system of the burden of compensating some victims. Any per-
son entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act
and indemnity under the no-fault system must seek benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and not from the Rdgie.96
In addition to reimbursing auto accident victims for medical ex-
penses, the Act provides for replacement of lost wages. The Act gives a
formula for calculating the estimated income of an auto accident victim
who is unable to work because of injuries.97 Calculation of the victim's
income is based on the victim's pre-accident gross income from employ-
ment, up to an annual maximum.98 Net income is then calculated by
subtracting income taxes from the gross income amount. 9 The victim is
then reimbursed for ninety percent of the victim's income.lco Payments
are made twice monthly to the victim beginning one week after the acci-
dent and continuing throughout the time of the victim's disability.101
Once the injured person returns to work, if the individual earns as
much as or more than before the accident, the Rdgie stops making pay-
ments.102 If the person earns less in a new job than the person earned
before the accident, the payments are reduced by an amount equal to fifty
percent of the first 5000 Canadian dollars of earned income plus seventy-
five percent of the earned income in excess of 5000 Canadian dollars.10 3
The Act makes special provisions for giving income-type reimburse-
ment to victims who are not eligible for income reimbursement.10 4 Peo-
ple covered by these special provisions include the unemployed, persons
94. Id
95. Id
96. Quk REv. STAT. ch. A-25, § 18.
97. Qua. REv. STAT. ch. A-25, § 27, amended by ch. 59, § 12, 1982 Qu6. Stat. 1173,
1176.
98. Id The Act provides that the gross income maximum be recalculated annually to
equal 150% of average, nationwide earnings as established by the national statistics bureau,
Statistics Canada. Id § 50, amended by ch. 59, § 26, 1982 Qu& Stat. 1173, 1181. The annual
maximum in 1986 was 34,500 Canadian dollars. O'Connell & Tenser, supra note 69, at 921.
99. Id
100. Id § 26.
101. Id § 35.
102. Id § 31, amended by ch. 59, § 14, 1982 Qu& Stat. 1173, 1177.
103. Id
104. See Qut. REv. STAT. ch. A-25, §§ 20, 21, 23.
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at home, and students. 10 5
Accident victims who were unemployed at the time of the accident
are entitled to compensation based on income they could have had, based
on their "experience and . . . physical and intellectual capacities," as
determined by the Rigie.1°6
Any victim who is a person at home who becomes unable to perform
ordinary household chores is entitled to indemnity for expenses incurred
as a result of injury. 0 7 Such expenses may include, but are not limited
to, domestic help and housework expenses.108
The Act also provides for payments to students who become unable
to pursue their studies as a result of injuries sustained in an auto acci-
dent."° Any students who are employed or have contracts for future
employment at the time they suffer their injuries are indemnified on the
basis of the gross income they earned or would have earned. 110 All other
students are entitled to minimum income replacement indemnity. I"'
When the insured is killed in an auto accident, the Act provides
special benefits. A surviving spouse is entitled to payments for life.' 12
The amount of these payments is equivalent to a percentage of the in-
come replacement indemnity to which the deceased would have been en-
titled had the deceased survived the accident. 1 3 The percentage the
surviving spouse will receive is calculated on the basis of the total
number of dependents surviving the victim.114 The amount the surviving
spouse is entitled to receive will be reduced by any amount received by
the survivors from the Qu6bec Pension Plan.' 15
If the decedent leaves no surviving spouse, dependents will receive
payments until the time when they would no longer have been depen-
dents had the decedent lived. 116 In cases where the decedent leaves no
spouse and no dependents, the original version of the Act provided for a
lump sum payment to the decedent's parents or, if there were no parents,
to the estate.' 17 However, a 1982 amendment to the Act provides that if
105. Qut. REv. STAT. ch. A-25, §§ 20, 21, 23.
106. Id. § 20, amended by ch. 59, § 7, 1982 Qu6. Stat. 1173, 1174.
107. Id. § 23.
108. Id
109. Id. § 21.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. § 37, amended by ch. 59, § 18, 1982 Qu6. Stat. 1173, 1178.
113. Id.
114. Id
115. Id. § 41, amended by ch. 59, § 21, 1982 Qua. Stat. 1173, 1180.
116. Id. § 37, amended by ch. 59, § 18, 1982 Qu6. Stat. 1173, 1178.
117. Qut. REv. STAT. ch. A-25, § 38.
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the decedent "ensured the viability of a family enterprise," the owners of
that business are entitled to a portion of the indemnity."1 '
The Act also covers funeral expenses. The person who pays the fu-
neral expenses of the victim may claim up to 2000 Canadian dollars from
the Rdgie. 119
Although the Act eliminates a victim's right to bring a tort cause of
action, accident victims may still receive payment for noneconomic
losses such as pain and suffering under certain circumstances. A victim
who sustains "a loss of physical integrity or disfigurement" is entitled to
a lump sum for suffering or loss of enjoyment of life. 120 The amount of
indemnity decreases as the age of the victim increases; thus, infants re-
ceive larger sums than adults. 2 1
An interesting issue arises when an accident involves a Quebec mo-
torist and a motorist from a traditional tort system jurisdiction whose
right to compensation lies in the right to sue the motorist at fault. Qu6-
bec residents are not obligated to carry third-party liability insurance for
accidents occurring inside Qu~bec.'1 In such an accident, a non-Qu6bec
motorist is compensated by the Rigie "to the extent that he is not respon-
sible for the accident."'123
The Rdgie determines to what extent the nonresident motorist was
at fault.1 24 If the victim and the Rdgie dispute the extent of the victim's
responsibility, the issue of fault is litigated before the court1
Thus, the Act discriminates against all nonresidents by compensat-
ing them only to the extent that they are not at fault, 612 while residents
are compensated without regard to fault.1 21
The discriminatory treatment of nonresidents involved in accidents
in Qu6bec arguably violates general principles of equal protection by giv-
ing comprehensive coverage to residents and less protection to nonresi-
dents.'2  However, this discrimination can be justified.12 9  The
118. Act of Dec. 16, 1982, ch. 59, § 19, 1982 Qu& Stat. 1173, 1179.
119. Qua. Rnv. STAT. ch. A-25, § 47, amended by ch. 59, § 24, 1982 Qu& Stat. 1173,
1181.
120. Qu. REv. STAT. ch A-25, § 44, amended by ch. 59, § 22, 1982 Qu&. Stat. 1173, 1180.
121. Id § 204, sched. A, amended by ch. 59, § 37, 1982 Qu& Stat. 1173, 1184.
122. Walsh, "A Stranger in the Promised Land?" The Non-Resident Accident Victim and
the Quibec No-Fault Plan, 37 U.N.B. L.J. 173, 175 (1988).
123. Qufa. REv. STAT. ch. A-25, § 8.
124. Id
125. Id
126. Id
127. Id § 7.
128. No-fault acts in the United States have been challenged in American courts as viola-
five of the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. These challenges that no-fault
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compensation system managed by the Rdgie is funded solely by Quebec
residents. 130 Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to make disbursements
from the fund only to the contributors.13 1
The Act has special provisions regarding accidents which occur
outside Qu6bec. Quebec motorists are obligated under the Act to
purchase third-party liability insurance for travel in other provinces of
Canada and in the United States.1 32 Thus, Qu6bec motorists may be
sued by motorists from other jurisdictions when they are involved in ac-
cidents which occur outside Qu6bec. However, they may not be sued in
the Qu6bec courts.1 33 When a Qu6bec motorist is injured in an out-of-
province accident, the Qu6bec resident may still claim no-fault benefits
under the Act. 134 The Qu6bec resident may also sue the other driver
under the law of the jurisdiction where the accident occurred. 135 In this
situation, the Regie is subrogated to the extent of its indemnification of
the victim. 36 The victim may retain any excess damages awarded. 137
IV. NO-FAULT PERSONAL INJURY AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE IN NEW YORK
In contrast to Qu6bec's system in which no-fault compensation is
paid to victims by a government agency, no-fault insuramce in New York
is purchased by individual motorists through private insurance compa-
nies. 138 New York's Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Insurance Repara-
tions Act (the New York law) establishes that no-fault insurance is the
type of personal injury auto insurance to be offered in the state. Thus,
acts are discriminatory because they exclude nonresidents from protection have not been suc-
cessful, with courts consistently finding that the classification of accident victims on the basis
of state of residency is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of awarding no-
fault benefits only to those who have paid into the system. See, e.g., Cyr v. Farias, 327 N.E.2d
890 (Mass. 1975); Gersten v. Blackwell, 314 N.W.2d 645 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Perkins v.
Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 50 A.D.2d 1070, 377 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 394,
393 N.Y.S.2d 347, 361 N.E.2d 997 (1977).
129. Walsh, supra note 122, at 176.
130. See Quit. REv. STAT. ch. A-25, §§ 150-152.
131. Walsh, supra note 122, at 176.
132. Quit. REv. STAT. ch. A-25, § 85.
133. See id.
134. QuA. REV. STAT. ch. A-25, § 7.
135. Id.
136. Id The term "subrogation" means the payment or assumption of "an obligation for
which another is primarily liable." H. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 123 (2d ed. 1948). Thus, if a
Quebec motorist recovers damages through a tort suit in another jurisdiction, the Rdgie is
entitled to recoup the amount of benefits it has paid the insured.
137. See Qua. Rnv. STAT. ch. A-25, § 7.
138. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 310 (McKinney 1986).
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the New York State government does not actually provide insurance cov-
erage as the Qu6bec government does. However, the State of New York
closely regulates many aspects of the no-fault plan, including rates, rate
increases, and medical fees charged for treating accident victims.'3 9
New York's no-fault system is a modified no-fault plan which elimi-
nates the injured party's right to sue in tort, except in cases of "serious
injury."'"' The statute provides that "... there shall be no right of re-
covery for non-economic loss, except in the case of a serious injury, or for
basic economic loss."' 4 ' Basic economic loss is statutorily defined as ex-
penses such as medical payments and lost wages totaling 50,000 dollars
or less. 42 Basic economic loss does not include any loss incurred on
account of death; 4 3 thus, there is no abridgement of the survivors' right
to bring a wrongful death suit when a person is killed in an auto accident.
Pursuant to the New York law, claimants may bring a tort suit if
they suffer serious injury. Serious injuries include death, dismember-
ment, significant disfigurement, a fracture, loss of fetus, and permanent
loss of the use of a body organ.1 4 The term "serious injury" also in-
cludes injuries which result in significantly limited use of a body function
or system.' 45 A serious injury also includes a medically determined in-
jury or nonpermanent impairment which "prevents the injured person
from performing substantially all of the material acts" which constitute
the person's usual daily activities for at least ninety days of the one hun-
dred eighty days immediately following the date of the injury. 146 Thus, a
victim may only bring a tort suit for noneconomic loss--Ie, for pain and
suffering and other nonmonetary detriment' 47--in cases involving seri-
ous injury or death.
Benefits provided pursuant to the New York law are aggregated-
the insured may receive a maximum of 50,000 dollars in no-fault bene-
fits.' 48 Thus, the total amount paid to a policyholder for losses from a
single accident will never exceed 50,000 dollars.
A wide variety of medical and rehabilitation expenses are included
in the New York law's enumeration of covered expenses. Medical, surgi-
139. See N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5101-5108 (McKinney 1985).
140. _d § 5104(a).
141. Id
142. Id § 5102(a).
143. Id § 5102(aX4).
144. Id § 5102(d).
145. Id
146. Id
147. Id § 5102(c).
148. Id § 5102(a).
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cal, nursing, dental, hospital, x-ray, ambulance and prosthetic services;
psychiatric, physical, and occupational therapy; prescription drugs; non-
medical religious methods of healing recognized by New York law; and
any other professional health services are all covered by the no-fault
provisions. 49
The amounts charged by providers of health services are regulated
by the state. The insurance law mandates the application of the fee
schedule prepared by the Workers' Compensation Board to services ren-
dered to auto accident victims.150 If the insurer determines that unique
circumstances or use of special procedures justify an excess charge, there
is an exception to the limit imposed by the industrial accident fee
schedule. 151
Under the New York law, victims are entitled to receive replace-
ment income for earnings which they would have earned had they not
been injured-up to 1000 dollars per month for not more than three
years from the date of the accident causing the injury."' If victims are
entitled to receive earnings replacement from their employers, and these
payments do not result in a reduction of the employees' income or level
of future benefits due from the employers, the victims will not receive
earnings replacement from their no-fault insurance plans.1 53 Other rea-
sonable and necessary expenses incurred, up to twenty-five dollars a day
for up to one year from the date of the accident, are also reimbursed
under the no-fault plan. 54
Death benefits of 2000 dollars are payable to the estate of a victim of
an auto accident in addition to the basic economic loss benefits.' 5  In the
event of death, the survivors are not precluded from 'bringing a tradi-
tional tort suit to collect damages.
Noneconomic losses are not covered by the insurers under the New
York law. Noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering are recover-
able only through a tort suit. 56 However, to be able to bring a tort suit,
the insured must meet the threshold of serious injury as defined in the
New York law.
The New York no-fault plan provides coverage for accidents, even if
149. Id. § 5102(a)(1).
150. Id. § 5108(a).
151. Id.
152. Id. § 5102(a)(2).
153. Id.
154. Id. § 5102(a)(3).
155. Id. § 5103(a)(4).
156. Id. § 5104(a).
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they occur outside New York State. The insured and the members of the
insured's household are entitled to first party benefits for accidents occur-
ring anywhere in the United States or Canada.157 The New York insurer
has a lien on any recovery the insured may receive from a tort suit in the
jurisdiction where the accident occurred. 158
V. COMPARISON OF SOME ASPECTS OF THE
QUEBEC AND NEW YORK PLANS
One of the principal differences between the Qu6bec and New York
no-fault plans is the means by which the insurance is provided. Quebec-
type government administration of a no-fault plan has many advantages.
First, government officials administering an insurance plan would be less
likely to make bad faith refusals to pay on deserving claims than would a
private insurance company.159 A private insurance company is con-
cerned with showing a profit at the end of the year. A government
agency is unaffected by this underlying profit-making motive. Thus, a
government agency would have less incentive to deny claims because the
government agency is less concerned with how much of each premium
dollar constitutes profit.
Second, in terms of overall efficiency, a government administered
plan is probably more efficient. In Qu6bec, the Rigie administers the
plan and regulates itself, defining the terms used in the Act and drafting
the rules of proof and procedure which govern the filing of claims. In
New York, although the insurance companies have responsibility for
compensating the injured,1" the state still has extensive administrative
responsibilities, including the regulation of rates, review of proposed rate
increases, and monitoring of medical costs. 6" If New York actually pro-
vided the insurance under the no-fault plan, the state legislature would
set the rates and the state agency administering the insurance plan would
then implement the rates, thus decreasing the need for monitoring of pri-
vate insurance companies' compliance with the state-set rates.
One disadvantage of the Qu6bec system is the extremely broad dis-
cretion granted to the Rigie. Qu6bec's insurance act has been criticized
157. Id § 5103(aX3).
158. Id § 5104(b).
159. Bad faith implies a willful refusal to respond to unambiguous contractual obligations.
Thus, a bad faith refusal to pay a claim occurs when an insurance company refuses to pay on a
claim which clearly falls within the contractual obligation of the insurer. National Labor Re-
lations Bd. v. Knoxville Pub. Co., 124 F.2d 875, 883 (6th cir. 1942) (dictum).
160. N.Y. INS. LAw § 5102(a) (McKinney 1985).
161. Id § 5108.
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for not delineating more express guidelines to be followed by the Rdgie
and for failing to provide judicial review. 62 The purpose of this grant of
extensive power was to speed compensation to accident victims. In light
of this driving purpose, the broad discretion granted to the Rdgie is per-
haps justified. The Qu6bec legislature has considered the competing
objectives of speedy, efficient compensation and comprehensive judicial
review of indemnification decisions, and decided that speedy compensa-
tion and efficiency are of higher priority. 163While speedy compensation is undoubtedly a valid objective of any
insurance plan, the Qu6bec legislature has put too much emphasis on this
aspect and has jeopardized the integrity of the entire no-fault system.
Too much power and discretion have been granted to the Rdgie. A sys-
tem of judicial review is needed to monitor regulations promulgated by
the Rdgie which affect the scope, interpretation, and implementation of
the Act.
Another disadvantage of the Act is that it does not impose a time
limit for processing claims. A statutory time limit is needed to prevent
the Rdgie from engaging in bureaucratic foot-dragging in processing acci-
dent claims. A government body administering a no-fault program
should be monitored more closely than the Rdgie is monitored in Qu6bec.
With no process for review of regulatory decisions made by the Rdgie,
there is too much potential for abuse of discretion.
Another important difference between the Qu6bec and New York
plans is that Qu6bec entirely eliminates the right to bring a tort suit,
while New York preserves the right in some cases. Experts argue that
maintenance of the tort suit acts as a deterrent to recklessness and negli-
gence because the threat of liability causes people to behave more cau-
tiously when their behavior might affect others.
In the context of automobile driving, however, it is not clear that
such a deterrent effect exists. As long as the driver has insurance, the
threat of liability is not a threat against the driver's personal assets; it is
only a threat of an expensive claim to the driver's insurance company.
The result to the insured of a claim against the company is a possible rate
increase or, in extreme cases, cancellation of the policy. 64 Further,
162. Baudouin, supra note 71, at 390.
163. Id
164. Sugarman, supra note 30, at 578. Professor Sugarman points out that it is hard to
believe that fear of increases in insurance rates causes people to drive more safely where moral
qualms, self-preservation interests, and fear of fines or losing a license have not had a similar
effect. He notes that fear of higher rates does cause nonreporting and private settlement of'
small accident claims.
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many people do not purchase bodily injury insurance at all in spite of the
threat of liability.16 5 Thus, it is not clear that the threat of tort liability
has any deterrent effect in the context of automobile accidents.
As a practical matter, it would be extremely difficult to eliminate the
right to bring a tort action for personal injuries suffered in an auto acci-
dent in any American jurisdiction. The active trial lawyers' lobby is ve-
hemently opposed to a complete elimination of the right to bring a tort
suit for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident.'" Thus,
it is improbable that a state could entirely eliminate the right to bring
tort suits in the auto accident context.
While eliminating the injured party's right to sue in tort, the Quebec
Act does provide for a lump sum payment for pain and suffering in cases
of permanent injury. In contrast, none of the states in the United States
with a no-fault system provides benefits for pain and suffering. In the
United States, compensation for pain and suffering is recoverable solely
as a result of a successful tort cause of action.1 67
There is a great advantage in maintaining the right of a victim to
bring a tort suit in some situations. When the auto accident victim is
seriously injured, disfigured, or killed, the value of the loss sustained is
virtually impossible to assess. In cases of serious injury or death, one
purpose of the damages award is to vindicate the injured.168 In such
circumstances, the plaintiff may feel that the plaintiff's rights have not
been vindicated if the value of personal loss is assessed by a government
agency. A jury verdict is the only proper means of assessing the amount
of the damage. A verdict rendered by a jury composed of members of
the public is more likely to make the plaintiff feel as though he or she has
been fairly compensated and has been given his or her day in court.
Another important difference between the Qu6bec and New York
plans is how the premiums are calculated. The Regie in Qu6bec charges
the same premium to all licensed drivers and owners of registered vehi-
cles. 169 In New York, insurance companies may charge varying rates to
drivers of different risks, so long as those risks are calculated with actua-
rially sound data.170 The argument can be made that age-adjusted and
sex-adjusted premiums are discriminatory, and that only a flat-rate pre-
165. Hinds, supra note 6, at 10, col. 4.
166. Dresslar, New.York-Style No Fault Bill Introduced, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 26, 1989, at 5,
col. 1.
167. See generally O'Connell, Operation of No-Fault Auto Law: A Survey of the Survy,
56 NEB. L. REV. 23 (1977).
168. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 4.
169. O'Connell & Tenser, supra note 69, at 928; see also Qut. REV. STAT. ch. A-25, § 151.
170. See N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 2328, 2331 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990).
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mium like Qu6bec's is fair. However, if the insurer can establish through
reliable data that certain groups are more likely to be involved in acci-
dents, that insurer should be able to charge members of those groups
higher rates.
Professor Marc Gaudry analyzed data from Qu6bec and concluded
that Qu6bec's flat-rate premium pricing has been one catalyst in an in-
crease in the number of automobile accidents in Qu6bec. 171 Gaudry
found a thirty-one percent increase in accidents and a six percent in-
crease in deaths due to auto accidents since the promulgation of the
Act. 172 This increase was partly due to the fact that flat-rate premiums
result in a significant reduction in auto insurance costs for high-risk driv-
ers (e.g., young males). 173 The effect of this reduction is to allow many
high-risk drivers, who would be unable to afford insurance under the
traditional system, to purchase insurance. 174 Thus, there are more high-
risk drivers on the road and, consequently, more accidents. 17-
Another critical difference between the Quebec and New York plans
is who must pay the premiums. Under the Qu6bec plan, all licensed driv-
ers must pay the no-fault bodily injury insurance fee. Under the New
York plan, no-fault insurance is purchased only by the owners of regis-
tered vehicles. The Qu6bec system thus has the advantage of spreading
the cost of bodily injuries caused by auto accidents among all drivers,
rather than putting the entire burden on the owners of registered cars.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR A NO-FAULT PLAN FOR
CALIFORNIA
No-fault automobile insurance has been a subject of debate in the
California legislature for the last twenty years. Since 1970, at least
thirty-five no-fault type bills have been introduced in the California legis-
lature.176 There have also been at least two attempts to enact a no-fault
171. M. GAUDRY, RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACCIDENTS: RELEVANT RESULTS SELECTED
FROM THE DRAG MODEL (Publication No. 544, Centre de Recherche sur les Transports,
Universit6 de Montr.al, 1987); see also Trebilcock, The Future of Tort Law. Mapping the Con-
tours of the Debate, 15 CAN. Bus. L.J. 471, 475-76 (1989). However, the U.S. Department of
Transportation compared the data from no-fault and traditional liability insurance states and
concluded that there was no significant difference in the highway fatality and injury rates, U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 10, at 4.
172. See M. GAUDRY, supra note 171.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. George, supra note 15, at 1067. See also 1970 Session: S.B. 797 (Beilenson), 1970 Sess.
(Cal. 1970). 1971 Session: S.B. 117 (Lagomarsino), 1971 Sess. (Cal. 1971); A.B. 1030 (Bee),
1971 Sess. (Cal. 1971); A.B. 1505 (Fenton et al.), 1971 Sess. (Cal. 1971), and S.B. 515 (Beilen-
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system through initiatives."T These efforts to bring no-fault to California
have so far been unsuccessful.
In 1988 there were four automobile insurance related initiatives on
the ballot. 7 ' Proposition 103 is the only one which passed. It provides
for a reduction in rates for all types of insurance to a price which is at
least twenty percent less than the charges for the same insurance in No-
vember 1987.'
Some critics charge that the only effects of the proposition will be to
lower insurance rates in Los Angeles and raise rates in other areas of
California. 80
California voters also defeated a no-fault proposition in the 1988
election. Proposition 104 was the insurance industry's no-fault proposal.
The benefits proposed under the plan were meager: 10,000 dollars for
medical expenses, 15,000 dollars for wage loss, and 5000 dollars in fu-
neral benefits.'"
The California Trial Lawyers' Association (CTLA) argues that the
defeat of Proposition 104 is an indication that Californians do not want
no-fault in their state.8 2 The CTLA also argues that no-fault is not a
viable alternative for California.'83 They argue that there are high built-
in costs in California, such as the large number of registered automobiles,
the large number of licensed drivers, the large number of miles driven by
son), 1971 Sess. (Cal. 1971). 1972 Session: A.B. 125 (Fenton et al.), 1972 Sess. (Cal. 1972);
S.B. 26 (Nejedly), 1972 Sess. (Cal. 1972); S.B. 40 (Song et al.), 1972 Sess. (Cal. 1972); S.B.
354 (Be'lenson), 1972 Sess. (Cal. 1972); S.B. 1050 (Zenovich & Mills), 1972 Sess. (Cal. 1972);
S.B. 1155 (Song), 1972 Sess. (Cal. 1972). 1973-74 Session: A.B. 50 (Fenton), 1973-74 Sess.
(Cal. 1974); A.B. 801 (Foran et al.), 1973-74 Sess (Cal. 1974); S.B. 10 (Song), 1973-74 Sess.
(Cal.1974); S.B. 410 (Zenovich), 1973-74 Sess. (Cal. 1974); S.B. 429 (Mills et aL), 1973-74
Sess. (Cal.1974); S.B. 557 (Bradley et al.), 1973-74 Sess. (Cal. 1974); S.B. 1273 (Nejedly),
1973-74 Sess. (Cal. 1974); S.B. 2350 (Moscone), 1973-74 Sess. (Cal. 1974); and S.B. 2425
(Bradley et al.), 1973-74 Sess. (Cal. 1974). 1975-76 Session: A.B. 500 (Fenton et al.), 1975-76
Sess. (Cal. 1976); A.B. 1458 (McAlister et. al.), 1975-76 Sess. (Cal. 1976); S.B. 1091 (Roberti),
1975-76 Sess. (Cal. 1976); S.B. 1170 (Behr), 1975-76 Sess. (Cal. 1976); S.B. 1207 (Beilenson &
Song), 1975-76 Sess. (Cal. 1976); and S.B. 1408 (Rains), 1975-76 Sess. (Cal. 1976). 1979-80
Session: A.B. 106 (Young), 1979-80 Sess. (Cal. 1980); A.B. 116 (McAlister et. al.), 1979-80
Sess. (Cal. 1980); and S.B. 322 (Garamendi), 1979-80 Sess. (Cal. 1980). 1989-90 Session: A.B.
354 (Johnston), 1989-90 Sess. (Cal. 1989); A.B. 744 (Calderon), 1989-90 Sess. (Cal. 1989);
A-B. 2429 (Hill), 1989-90 Sess. (Cal.. 1989); and S.B. 1232 (Kopp), 1989-90 Sess. (Cal. 1989).
177. George, supra note 15, at 1068.
178. See CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET (Nov. 8, 1988) (general election).
179. CAL INS. CODE § 1861.01(a) (West Supp. 1990).
180. See eg., George, supra note 15, at 1074.
181. CALIFORNiA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 178, at 146.
182. George, supra note 15, at 1067.
183. See Dresslar, supra note 166, at 5, col. 1.
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residents and the high health care costs.18 4  The CTLA. argues that these
high built-in costs will result in high administrative costs and prevent
Californians from realizing substantial rate reductions under a no-fault
plan.185
It does appear that with the limitations of our present health care
system, consumers may not enjoy an immediate, substantial rate reduc-
tion under no-fault insurance. Data collected by the Department of
Transportation show that in general, insurance rates do not go down af-
ter no-fault insurance is implemented. 1 6 However, recent data suggest
that no-fault premiums do not rise as rapidly over time as traditional
insurance premiums;187 thus, it is likely that there would be future sav-
ings to California consumers.
There are other very attractive benefits of no-fault which would be
realized by California consumers. First, a greater number of accident
victims receive compensation under no-fault schemes than under tradi-
tional insurance schemes.188 Further, the compensation is paid to vic-
tims more quickly under no-fault schemes than under traditional
schemes.189 The reduction in the number of tort suits which follows the
implementation of no-fault would result in taxpayer savings in the form
of lower overall court costs. 190 Thus, the advantages of a no-fault system
are sufficient to merit the adoption of no-fault in California.
A no-fault insurance law for California should have the following
characteristics: the right to bring a tort suit should be maintained, but
strictly limited; the insurance should be provided through a government
agency; premiums should be collected from all licensed drivers; the ben-
efits provided under the plan should be extremely generous; and the plan
should provide a statutory amount of death benefits which are immedi-
ately available to the victim's survivors.
The victim's right to bring a tort suit should be maintained in a no-
184. Id. at 5, col. 3.
185. Id.
186. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 10, at 4.
187. O'Connell, supra note 11, at 997-99.
188. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 10, at 3. In its 1985 report on no-fault auto
insurance plans in the United States, the Department of Transportation found that the number
of claims paid per 100 insured cars in no-fault states averaged 1.8, while the paid claim fre-
quency in states with traditional bodily injury liability insurance was only 0.9.
189. Id. at 4. One study showed that no-fault claimants received 33% of the benefits they
would ever receive within thirty days of notification of the insurance company of their injury,
while claimants under traditional systems received only 8.3% of the compensation they would
ever receive within thirty days of notification of the insurance company. Id.
190. Id. at 5. In 1984 Chief Justice Warren Burger found that each jury trial tort case cost
taxpayers 8300 dollars in court and other public costs.
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fault plan for California because the compensation available under a no-
fault scheme is insufficient for those who suffer severe injuries or death as
the result of an auto accident. However, the threshold for bringing suit
must be high enough to prevent a large percentage of all auto accident
claims from proceeding through the tort system. The threshold for
bringing suit should be identical to the serious injury threshold defined in
the New York Insurance Law. The New York threshold is high enough
to screen out most lawsuits, but low enough to allow those who are seri-
ously injured to seek compensation through a tort suit.
The no-fault plan should be implemented through a government
agency with regulatory powers similar to those exercised by the Rigie in
Qu6bec. However, a system of judicial review of the regulatory decisions
made by the government agency should be implemented to ensure that
the agency does not abuse its discretion in defining the scope of coverage
and in creating its own procedures.
The agency administering the no-fault plan should collect premiums
from all licensed drivers, as the Rigie does in Qu6bec. However, the
premium should be adjusted according to factors which affect the
amount of risk involved with each individual driver, such as age and sex.
The wage loss benefits provided under the plan should be more gen-
erous than those available under the New York plan. The New York
maximum of 1000 dollars per month is too low to fully compensate many
accident victims. The California law should provide for much larger
wage loss benefits, paid to the insured in monthly payments for up to
three years following the date of the injury. 191
The California no-fault law should also provide for unlimited medi-
cal expenses.1 92 The agency which administers the no-fault plan must
adopt a medical fee schedule, similar to the one used by New York insur-
ers, to regulate the amount charged by health care providers.
The no-fault plan should also provide for a statutory amount of
death benefits for the decedent's survivors. These benefits should be pro-
vided immediately to help defray funeral and other expenses the survi-
vors may incur immediately after the victim's death.
191. The no-fault law in Michigan provides for very generous wage loss benefits. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3107(b) (West 1985). In September 1990 the maximum wage
loss benefits available under the Michigan law were 2808 dollars per month for three years for
a total of 101,088 dollars. Michigan administrative regulations provide that the Commissioner
of Insurance modify the monthly figure each year to reflect changes in the national consumer
price index. MICH. ADMiN. CODE r. 500.811 (1979).
192. Michigan law provides for unlimited medical expenses. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 500.3107(a) (West 1985).
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VI. CONCLUSION
As liability insurance rates increase and the deficiencies in the tradi-
tional tort system become more apparent, the need to consider alterna-
tive compensation schemes becomes more urgent. No-fault personal
injury automobile insurance is a practical, more effective alternative to
the traditional tort system for compensating auto accident victims.
While each victim compensated under no-fault schemes receives less
money than each victim compensated under the traditional system, 193
more victims are compensated under no-fault overall, and a greater per-
centage of each premium dollar is paid to injured claimants in no-fault
jurisdictions than in common law jurisdictions. 194
While the system adopted in Qu6bec is admirable, implementing a
pure no-fault system in California would require sweeping reform that
legislators, consumers, and the insurance industry are not currently pre-
pared to face. However, a modified no-fault system similar to New
York's should be implemented in California.
193. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 10, at 3-4.
194. Id. at 4.
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